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Since the discovery of the Cusiana and Cupiagua fields in 1991 and
1993, respectively, Colombia's oil industry has become increasingly impor-
tant.' These discoveries increased, by 1.2 billion barrels (b/bls),2 the coun-
try's total proven oil reserves, which now add up -to approximately 2.6
(bibls).3 This Latin American nation's potential is more significant when
taking into account official estimates that a total of 24 to 30 (b/bls) are still
to be proved,4 making it comparable to Qatar one of the smallest of the
OPEC members in terms of oil reserves. Colombia's oil is lighter and
'Of Counsel, Prieto & Carrizosa S.A. To Armando's teachings...
Colombia, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/colombia.html (last visited Feb. 2000).
2 An Energy Overview of Colombia, at http://www.fe.doe.gov/intemational/colbover.html
(last visited July 2001).
3 Ajustes a la politica petrolera: Nueva Visi6n Contractual, Carta Petrolera, paragraph 3
(Nov.- Dec. 1997) available at
http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/prin/review/carta/nov99/cartand.html.
4 Mayores oportunidades de inversi6n petrolera, Carta Petrolera, page 5, paragraph 2
(Sept.-Oct. 1997) available at
http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/prin/review/carta/nov99/cartand.html.
5 OPEC has a total of 805.0 giga billion barrels (gbbls) in proven oil reserves. Reservas
de Pet r6leo de la OPEP, available at
http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/esop/esopet/l999/estadisticas 1 999.htm (last visited May
2001). This is approximately 80 percent of the world's 1016.0 (gbbls). Reservas Mundiales
de Petr6leo, available at
http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/esop/esopet/l999/estadisticas1999.htm (last visited May
2001). OPEC's members, in decreasing order, are Saudi Arabia with 262.784 (b/bls), Iraq
with 112.5 (b/bls), United Arab Emirates with 97.8 (b/bls), Kuwait with 96.5 (b/bls), Iran
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sweeter than that of its Latin American neighbors, and 50% of its produc-
tion is exported to the U.S.
6
Nevertheless, it has been estimated that at the current rate of produc-
tion, Colombia would cease to be a net oil exporter by the year 2004.7
Thus, serious challenges still lie ahead if the country wishes to continue on
the path to acquiring an oil-rich status. The challenges are more daunting
after taking into account the fact that, since the time of the discovery of the
Cusiana and Cupiagua fields, the national economy has become increas-
ingly dependent on oil revenues.
8
Accordingly, the main priority in Colombia's oil policy is to increase
production and to attract foreign investment for the exploration and exploi-
tation of additional sources and existing ones.
Since Colombian companies lack the capital and technology necessary
for such a costly, risky and complex undertaking, foreign companies mostly
conduct the exploitation and exploration of oil. As a practical matter, pe-
troleum prospecting - the industry's jargon for finding oil - is not an easy
task. Subterranean information is gathered and subsequently interpreted to
determine the existence of locations where the necessary geologic elements
forming a reservoir are present.10 Traditionally, this has been carried out by
pounding the earth with a truck-installed vibrator, or by exploding small
charges underneath it." The length of the time intervals between waves re-
flected from rock determines the formation's distance from the surface. 2
Today's modern technology has significantly reduced the randomness of pe-
troleum prospecting using satellites, which enable the mapping of oil fields
with remarkable accurateness and a low impact on the environment.
1 3
However, the existence of hydrocarbons can still only be confirmed by
with 93.1 (b/bls), Venezuela with 76.8 (b/bls), Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
with 29.5 (b/bls), Nigeria with 22.50 (b/bls), Algeria with 11.3 (b/bls), Indonesia with 4.9
(b/bls), and Qatar with 3.7 (b/bls), available at http://www.opec.org (last visited May 2001).
The region with the second largest amount of reserves is Latin America, with 12 percent of
the world's total, Estadisticas de la Industria Petrolera 1999, available at
http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/esop/esopet/1999/estadisticas1999.htm (last visited May
2001).
6 Colombia, supra note I.
7id.
8 This accounts for up to 35 percent of the government revenue, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/colombia.html (last visited July 2001). Id
Currently there are 43 foreign oil companies operating in the country. El Petr6leo en Colom-
bia, at http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/prin/petroleo/petrol.htm (last visited May 2001).
9 These elements include a source rock that generates hydrocarbons, a reservoir rock,
which holds them, and a structural trap that acts as a lid by not allowing them to leak away.
A Petroleum Prospecting Primer, at
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"wildcatting,"'14 or drilling rotary tools into wells that are sometimes as far
as five miles from the earth's surface.15
In Colombia, as in many other countries with oil reserves potential, the
government has sought to reduce the activity's inherent high degree of un-
certainty by shaping the legal and economic environment that foreign com-
panies have to operate in, making it more profitable and attractive for
them.
1 6
This paper seeks to accurately represent this environment to the pro-
spective investor, starting with the structures of the two basic transactions,
referred to herein as "modes", through which most commonly, foreign com-
panies participate in the oil industry in Colombia, namely, the Standard As-
sociation Mode ("S.A.M") and the Risk Sharing Mode ("R.S.M.").17 The
contractual agreements corresponding to these modes are standardized and
allow little tailoring to fit individual company needs.
This part of the analysis will also include recent modifications to the
foregoing modes, introduced to meet the government's announced oil-policy
objectives of increasing production, exploiting the existing reserves, and
finding additional ones. In addition, a brief examination of the taxation re-
gime will be followed by a discussion of the regulation implemented to pro-
tect the environment and Colombian minority ethnic groups.
II. BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Law 165 chartered Ecopetrol, a government business corporation, in
1948 with sufficient powers to explore and exploit the country's oil.1 8 How-
14 This expression is taken from "wildcatters", which refers to the early oil explorers who
were said to drill anywhere they landed. Exploration and Production, Finding Oil and Gas,
at http://www.shell.con/eandpen/content/0,4053,27188-52909,00.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2001).
IS The drilling rate varies depending on the hardness of the rock. The average speed of a
drill is 198 feet per hour but it can be as slow as 99 feet per hour when the rock is very hard.
Down the Hole, at http://www.shell.com./b/bl 01 a5.html (last visited Nov. 1998).
16 In Colombia, like in many civil law countries, the legal and political conception exists
according to which the subsoil is the people's property. Thus, technically, as stipulated by
article 102 of the Colombian Constitution, the government owns the mineral resources and
has the obligation to administer them commensurate with the general interest. See
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 102.
'7 Other modes were implemented in October 1997 for areas about which there is little
geological information, such as areas that are distant from roads and other means of trans-
portation, small areas for which production is estimated under 30 million barrels ("bls") and
areas with a diminishing rate of production. However, this experience was only partially
successful because few companies adhered to these modes after they were introduced.
1S Ley 165, Diario Oficial, Dec. 27, 1948 [26904], at 998. In civil law countries, as is
Colombia, the main sources of laws are acts of the national legislature. There are no local
legislatures. As opposed to the common law, court holdings are binding only in exceptional
cases, subject to certain limitations. Thus, when referring to a "law" in this context, it is not
a court holding, but an act of Congress.
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However, due to capital restraints, Decree 2310 further defined Ecopetrol's
charter, enabling it to hire private companies through association agree-
ments or any other kind of service or production agreement except conces-
sions.19 Thus, Ecopetrol is the exclusive enterprise with which the private
contractor must deal .20
III. STANDARD ASSOCIATION MODE ("S.A.M.")
This mode was first introduced during the 1970's.21 Foreign compa-
nies are associated upon their showing of interest and are not submitted to
any kind of bidding process. 22 Consequently, based upon reasonable con-
siderations, Ecopetrol can associate any company it wishes without the risk
of other interested companies instituting an action against its decision.
Chronologically, this mode initiates with an exploration stage during
which, at its own expense and risk, the associate company independently
explores the area to determine more precisely the presence of oil." This is
done by reprocessing seismic information already available that Ecopetrol
has the duty to furnish, and by gathering new information.24 The associate
then drills several orifices to confirm the existence of a well.25
Subsequently, if oil is not found after a period of time (which may last
from three to six years, as will be explained when referring to the agree-
ment's duration) the associate loses the investment made in exploring the
area.26 On the other hand, if oil is discovered, the parties enter a transitional
period during which Ecopetrol independently assesses whether the new well
can be exploited at a profit.27 A positive conclusion to this thorough
19 Decree No. 2310, Diario Oficial, Oct. 28, 1974 [34201], at 313. Decrees are similar to
regulations in the U.S. legal system. They specify the meaning of laws. The government
agency in charge of the specific matter enacts them. A concession in this context means to
grant the use and benefit of the land.
20 Nevertheless, Ecopetrol leads activities that are more within its financial reach.
21 El Petr6leo en Colombia, at http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/prin/petroleo/petrol.htm (last
visited May 2001).
22 Proceso de Negocio, at http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/ecop/explor/exp.htm (last visited
May 2001).
23 Section 5 Standard Asociation Mode [hereinafter S.A.M.].
24 Sections 5.1.1 and 6.1. S.A.M.
25 Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2 S.A.M. The amount of seismic information to be processed
and the number of holes to be drilled are specifically determined in each case. This is one of
the few instances where there is negotiation by the parties. All of the information, which has
to be transferred to Ecopetrol, will remain strictly confidential during a period of three years
starting from the exploration phase. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 S.A.M.
26 Section 5.4. S.A.M. This risk is not so high given the geological certainty of the area.
27 Section 9.1 S.A.M. If Ecopetrol doesn't find the well to be commercially viable, the
associate can choose to develop the well by itself and will have the right to receive 200 per-
cent of the cost (the investment in infrastructure and equipment used) of the activities it car-
ried out on its own plus 50 percent of the expenses incurred before Ecopetrol determined
whether or not the well was profitable. Section 9.10 S.A.M. Ecopetrol can then decide to
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evaluation marks the beginning of the exploitation phase and earns the as-
sociate the right to be reimbursed for 30% of the investment made in explo-
ration.28 The currency feature was introduced in the mode in October 1997.
It is designed to reduce the exchange rate risk of the operation and is consis-
tent with the government policy of encouraging foreign investment.
At the beginning of the exploitation phase, the forein company will be
solely responsible for exploiting and managing the well. 9 Both parties will
share the cost of the exploitation in proportion to their share of the produc-
tion. Exploitation will take place under the supervision of a specially as-
signed committee. 3  Specifically, this committee, composed by one
member from each party, will have the responsibility of determining if the
obligations under the mode's terms are being adequately performed and are
controlling the annual and long-term expenses incurred by the associate.32
As the well manager, the associate is in charge of allocating each
party's share of the production. 33  The associate is entitled to 70% of the
production before it reaches 60 million barrels ("bls").34 From that point
on, distribution is determined by the profitability of the well through the use
of a cost return factor. 35 Thus, compensation for both parties is the volume
participate in the operation. Section 9.6 S.A.M. Reimbursements are made with the produc-
tion proceeds. Section 21.2 S.A.M. In any event, whether having participated or not in the
well's development, Ecopetrol receives part of the well's production. Section 14.2.2 S.A.M.
28 This percentage was decreased from 50 percent in July 1999, given that the share of the
production received by the associate was increased. The associate will receive interest de-
termined at the Colombian rate. Section 9.2.3 S.A.M. The amount, including interests plus
principal, will be indexed according to the international inflation rate determined by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. Section 9.2.3 S.A.M.
29 Section 10.1 S.A.M.
30 Section 19.1 S.A.M.
31 Section 18.1 S.A.M. Each party has 50 percent of the voting power. See Sections 18.4
and 22.2 S.A.M. If both parties do not agree on a particular issue, they may nominate an ex-
pert and undertake to abide by his or her opinion. If the parties do not agree on whom to
nominate, they undertake to accept the appointment of an expert by the Colombian Society
of Engineers. Section 28.3 S.A.M. This does not apply to any legal disputes.
32 Section 19 S.A.M. For this purpose, the foreign company must implement an annual
budget along with a development plan. Section 11.1 S.A.M. The annual budget comprises
and limits all of the operations expenses, while the development plan is designed to provide
an idea of how the activities will evolve in five years. Sections 11.4 and 11.1.2 S.A.M. Un-
der no circumstance can the foreign associate incur any expense, which is not included in the
budget if it is over US S 40.000 without the committee's authorization. Section 11.6 S.A.M.
33 Section 12.3 S.A.M.
34 Section 14.2.1 S.A.M. This percentage was increased from 50 percent in July 1999.
35 Section 14.2.2.1 S.A.M. This ratio is determined by the following formula: R = <ac-
cumulated income/ [dwell development investment + (exploration cost - reimbursed explora-
tion costs)] >+ operation costs. The accumulated income is the value of the total production,
the dwell development investment is the amount invested in developing the well to begin
production. Section 14.2.3 S.A.M. The R factor is then used in another formula as de-
scribed in the following tables:
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of oil extracted, which can be at least 70% of 60 million bls for the associ-
ate or at least 30& of 60 million bls for Ecopetrol, depending on the returns
of the operation. The parties are free to dispose of their share of the produc-
tion at will.36
Regarding the agreement's duration, it can vary considerably between
three and twenty-eight years, depending on various circumstances. If ex-
ploration shows no positive results after a period of three years, the associ-
ate may choose to continue exploring after agreeing with Ecopetrol upon
yearly extensions with a limit of six years.37 On the other hand, the associ-
ate may also choose to terminate the operation after the three-year term or
any of its extensions without any penalty.3" If oil is found, a maximum pe-
riod of twenty-two years is available to extract the reserves.39 Any of the
two parties' failure to perform its duties during this term before expiration
constitutes an event of default under the agreement.40
Events of default under the agreement by the associate are unilaterally
declared by Ecopetrol if the associate company does not comply with any
of the terms and conditions agreed upon and it ceases to legally exist.41 Af-
ter declaring an event of default, Ecopetrol may cease to perform its duties
under the contract without defaulting.42 On the other hand, a default by
R Factor Associate's Share Ecopetrol's Share
< 1.5 70% 30%
1.5 -2.5 70/(R-0.5) 100-(70/(R-0.5))
> 3.0 35% 65%
Section 14.2.2.1 S.A.M. Agreement. Before December 1999, the R factor scale's starting
point was increasing from 1.0 to 1.5 as indicated in the table. Consequentially, the well has
to be more profitable now than it had to be then for Ecopetrol to be entitled to a share of the
production greater than 30 percent. This, of course, increases the enterprise's attractiveness
significantly for foreign associates.
36 Section 14.1 S.A.M.
37 Section 23 S.A.M.
38 Section 26.1 S.A.M. Nevertheless, the duty of gathering and processing seismic
information and conducting drillings as stipulated in the agreement still has to be fulfilled.
39 Not later than five years before the ending of this term, Ecopetrol and the associate
may agree to extend the exploitation period, at which point new terms and conditions may be
proposed and considered within the limits of the same S.A.M. regarding duration, production
distribution, events of default, termination, indemnification, dispute resolution and assigna-
bility. Section 23 S.A.M.
40 C6DIGO CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 1546 (Colom.).
41 Section 25 S.A.M.
42 C. civ. art 1546. As opposed to the associate's duties under the agreement, Ecopetrol's
duties during the exploitation phase aren't clearly specified. One can imply, however, they
are to protect the associate against any party judicially claiming to own the area; to designate
a representative to the controlling committee; not to interfere with the associate's exploita-
tion of the reserves under the agreement; to reimburse 30 percent of the exploration costs; to
finance 30 percent of the costs of exploitation and to appropriate its share of the production
including the percentage corresponding to royalties.
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43
Ecopetrol would have to be adjudicated by a court. 4  This is very onerous
to the other party since it implies it would have to wait for a court decree to
discontinue its performance under the agreement. In addition, the lack of
specification of events of default by Ecopetrol in the agreement brings un-
certainty to the associate since it would be subject to a court's interpretation
as to what Ecopetrol's duties were and under what standards they are to be
performed.
On the other hand, the occurrence of an event of default by the associ-
ate company before the seventeenth year, starting from the date of the
agreement, automatically triggers the associate's obligation to indemnify
Ecopetrol by selling to it the associate's interest in the operation at com-
mercial or book price, whichever is lower." If default takes place after the
seventeenth Y ear, the corresponding interest would have to be transferred
free of cost.4 On the other hand, if Ecopetrol defaults under the agreement
no indemnification is specified. Thus, similar to the lack of definitions of
events of default by Ecopetrol, this is considerably onerous since it means
the associate would be subject to a court's quantification of the loss to de-
termine the appropriate remedy.46
In addition to the option to terminate without penalty at certain stages
during the agreement (i.e. after the three year exploration term or any of its
extensions), the associate may also legally end the contractual relationship
by alleging force majeure - defined as a strike, war, earthquake, or flood -
and the enactment of any law that makes the execution of the agreement
impossible.47 This option can work in the associate's favor, given the high
regularity with which these events take place in Colombia."
With respect to its assignment, the agreement cannot be freely trans-
ferred without the consent of Ecopetrol and the Minister of Mines.4 9 This
reduces the associate's ability to easily retract from an undertaking, which,
43 C. civ. art 1546.
44 Section 22.10 S.A.M.
45 Section 26.2 S.A.M.
46 Upon determining that in fact Ecopetrol has breached the agreement, courts may alter-
natively terminate the agreement and award damages to the associate or force Ecopetrol to
continue with its duties under the agreement and award damages, depending on the plain-
tiffs petition. C. civ. art 1546.
47 Section 34 S.A.M.
48 Oil production has been the main target of attacks from guerrilla groups who resent the
presence of foreign companies in the country. As an example, the main pipeline, "Cano Li-
mon-Covenas", through which most of the country's oil is transported from the interior to the
Atlantic sea to export, has been attacked 526 times since 1982, spilling more than 1.6 million
barrels, causing enormous ecological disaster. These attacks forced Occidental Petroleum,
the major private operator of the pipeline, to incur higher operating costs of about $13 mil-
lion in 1997, Colombia, supra note I.
49 Section 27.1 S.A.M.
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for various reasons, may not prove economically beneficial to it, thus
affecting the commercial attractiveness of the investment.
Colombian law governs the contractual relationship, and any dispute
arising from it will be resolved in Colombian courts, pursuant to adminis-
trative procedure rules.50 No arbitration clause is included in the agreement.
This has highly unfavorable results on the parties, given the length of time
it usually takes for disputes to be resolved in the Colombian court system.
This also means the parties will not be able to enjoy the benefits of having
of people they deem qualified and competent as arbitrators.
As a final aspect, the associate company also must undertake to pur-
chase liability insurance to protect Ecopetrol against any losses suffered
under the agreement and any other third party affected against tort liabil-
ity.5 ' Insurance covers all the risks the committee deems convenient.52
IV. RISK SHARING MODE ("R.S.M.")
This mode was introduced during the 1970's together with the
S.A.M.53 Unlike under the S.A.M., foreign companies are not associated
freely but after an auction process the winner of which is the bidder that of-
fers the largest share of the production to Ecopetrol, starting from a mini-
mum base of 50%.
Chronologically, the same exploration and exploitation stages exist.54
Basically, however, the only difference in relation to the S.A.M., is that the
foreign associate's and Ecopetrol's roles reverse. Since the beginning of
the first stage, the state company explores the area. The costs of doing so
are split with the associate.55
The parties undergo the same transition period to assess the profitabil-
ity of the well.56  This evaluation however, is not carried out solely by
Ecopetrol but together with the associate through the same specially as-
signed committee that will later on supervise the performance of the agree-
ment during the exploitation phase. 7 Thus, under this mode the committee
functions in the same way as in the S.A.M. regarding composition and deci-
5o Section 35 S.A.M.
51 Section 39 S.A.M.
52 Section 33 S.A.M. This does not include depreciation.
53 El Petr6leo en Colombia, at http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/prin/petroleo/petrol.htm (last
visited May 2001).
54 Chapter II and I1, Risk Sharing Mode [hereinafter R.S.M.].
55 Sections 5.1.1. and 8 R.S.M. Notice that the costs here are split since the beginning.
Ecopetrol does not earn the right later on to be reimbursed as the associate does in the
S.A.M.
56 Section 10.1 R.S.M.
57 Section 10.1 R.S.M.
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sion making, but it starts operating right before the transition period, not af-
ter it as in the former mode.
5 8
A positive conclusion to the transitional period marks the beginning of
the exploitation phase.59 Ecopetrol will act as the operator, solely in charge
of distributing the production under the same supervision of the specially
assigned committee. 60 Both parties will bear the cost of exploitation in the
same proportion as its share of the production.
61
Regarding production distribution, the associate is entitled to the per-
centage proposed during the auction and Ecopetrol to the rest, before reach-
ing a cap of 60 million (bls).62 From that point on, each party's share is
determined through the used of a cost return factor different than the one
used in the S.A.M.63
The terms pertaining to duration, events of default, dispute resolution,
force majeure, assignability, and insurance are the same as in the S.A.M.
Sections 33-36, 38, 39, 40 and 42 R.S.M.64 Thus, the same certainty and
favorability analysis to the associate applies. Regarding indemnification,
however, because Ecopetrol is the operator, the equipment wouldn't have to
be transferred to it. Instead, Ecopetrol would automatically be transferred
the ownership of the whole operation.
The option to terminate the agreement without penalty at certain stages
during the agreement (for example, after the three year exploration term or
any of its extensions) is also provided under this mode. 5
58 Sections 24, 25 and 26 R.S.M.
59 Section 10.2 R.S.M.
60 Sections 27.1 and 27.2 R.S.M. The committee also controls the annual and long term
expenses incurred by the operator. Section 25.3.4 R.S.M.
61 Sections 13.1 and 13.2 R.S.M. The same as in the Standard Association Mode applies,
see supra, note 26. Section 11 R.S.M.
62 Section 20.1.1 R.S.M.
63 Section 20.1.2. This ratio is determined by the following formula: R = accumulated
income/ (dwell development investment + exploration cost + operation costs). The accumu-
lated income is the value of the total production, the dwell development investment is the
amount invested in developing the well to begin production. The R factor is then used in an-
other formula as described in the following tables:
R Factor Associate's Share Ecopetrol's Share
< 1.0 50-X 50+X
1.0-2.0 (50-X)IR 100-((50-X)/R)
> 2.0 (50-X)/2 100 - ((50-X)/2)
R.S.M. Agreement, Section 20. Where X is the percentage of the production offered by
the associate in the auction.
64 Sections 33-36, 38, 39, 40 and 42 R.S.M.
65 Section 34.1 R.S.M.
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V. TAXATION
It is important to bear in mind that production of gas or oil is distrib-
uted only after having deducted 20% of the total.66 This deduction is man-
datory by virtue of article 360 of the Colombian Constitution, which states
that the municipalities and departments67 where companies extract natural
resources are entitled to a certain percentage of royalties.68
Colombian central governments 69 assess oil producers with an annual
35% income tax,7° a seven percent tax over dividends remitted to foreign
countries, 71 a 1.5% stamp tax on all executed documents with a face value
equal or greater than approximately US $25,00072, a 6% pipeline transporta-
tion tax,73 and a 16% value added tax on most goods and services.74 A three
percent tax on all financial transactions, including withdrawals from check-
ing and savings accounts, is also assessed.75
Oil production is a main target of attack by guerrillas, who oppose ex-
ploitation by foreigners and believe the government should have a larger
role in production. Thus, companies have to make two special contribu-
tions to the army for defense expenses. The first one imposes $1 per barrel
produced, which gradually has been decreased starting since 1998 and will
be extinguished completely in 2001. The second contribution, also manda-
66 Sections 14.2.1 S.A.M. and 20.1.1 R.S.M. The government recently introduced a new
royalty distribution method. Royalties will not be fixed at 20 percent but at 5 percent and
will increase with production. Therefore, if production is within a range from 5,000 barrels
per day (bbls/d) to 125,000 (bbls/d) the royalty percentage will vary between 5 percent and
20 percent. With a range between 125,000 (bbls/d) and 400,000 (b/bls), the royalty percent-
age will vary by 20 percent. With a range between 400,000 (bbls/d) and 600,000 (bbls/d),
the royalty percentage will vary between 20 percent and 25 percent. With a range over
600,000 (bbls/d), the royalty percentage will be 25 percent. 619 del 2000.
67 CONSTITUC16N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 360. Article 289 of the Colombian Consti-
tution politically divides the territory into departments and municipalities. A department is
similar to a state in the United States, and a municipality similar to a county. CONSTITUCION
POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 289.
68 CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA art. 361. Article 361 states that a national fund,
using the royalties not distributed to departments and municipalities, must be created to fi-
nance social projects in the rest of the territorial entities where hydrocarbon production does
not take place. Congress Law 141 of 1994 further implements this article. Law No. 141,
Jun.30, 1994, [41.414] Diario Oficial, 1.
69 There are other local taxes.
70 Decree No. 624, mar. 28, 1989, [38.756] Diario Oficial, 1. The base for this tax is cal-
culated by subtracting operation costs, financial costs and depreciation of fixed assets from
the gross income.
71 Decree No. 624, mar. 28, 1989, [38.756] Diario Oficial, 1.
72 Law 383 1997 Decree No. 624, Mar. 28, 1989, [38.756] Diario Oficial, 1.
73 Decree No. 2140, Aug. 25, 1995, [28.835] Diario Oficial, 1. For oil transported from
the eastern part of the country this tax is two percent. Decree No. 2140, Aug. 25, 1995,
[28.835] Diario Oficial, 1.
74 Decree No. 624, mar. 28, 1989, [38.756] Diario Oficial, 1.
7' Law 633, 2000.
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tory for all persons having assets approximately over $ 100,000 dollars, was
created by Law Number 345 of 1996.76 It provides that a one-time contri-
bution of .5% of the value of the total liquid assets has to be made through
the purchase of war bonds, which accrue interest at 80% of the yearly infla-
tion.77 Taxpayers can use these bonds can use to pay other taxes.
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL AND ETHNIC PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
Law 99 of 1993 is the basic Colombian environmental law. This law
requires that all exploitation of natural resources must have the lowest pos-
sible impact on the environment. 78 The associate company needs to obtain
a license after submitting a plan for environmental conservation and reha-
bilitation to the Ministry of Environment. 79 This process takes anywhere
between six months to one year. 0 Other requirements, which reflect the
public policy adopted several years ago to protect the nation's identity and
cultural heritage, can make this time period longer. Specifically, article 330
of the Colombian constitution mandates the exploitation of natural re-
sources in Indian territories to be carried out without undermining their so-
cial, economic and cultural soundness. 81 Furthermore, article 76 of Law 99
of 1993 requires that, prior to extracting natural resources from Indian and
African-Colombian territories, the environmental, social, and cultural im-
pact have to be evaluated jointly with members from the communities in-
habiting them.82 Thus, without the consent of these minorities, an associate
company cannot exploit oil reserves."
76 Law No. 345, Dec. 27, 1996, [42.951] Diario Oficial, 6.
77 Decree 204 of 1997, specified that these bonds were to be bearer bonds. In addition, it
specified that the .5 percent excluded investments in stocks, pension, and social security
funds. The total amount of bonds issued was 600,000 million pesos, around 5 billion dollars
in 1998. Decree No. 204, Jan. 30, 1997, [42.973] Diario Oficial, 4.
78 Law No. 99, Dec. 22, 1993, [41.146] Diario Oficial, 1.
79 Law No. 99, Dec. 22, 1993, [41.146] Diario Oficial, 1.
80 In May 1999 seismic and drilling exploratory activities were exempted from this re-
quirement to reduce the process's length, as part of the government's effort to improve the
prospects of investing in Colombia. Decree No. 788 May 7, 1999, [43.574] Diario Oficial,
13.
81 CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 330.
82 Law No. 99, Dec. 22 , 1993, [41.146] Diario Oficial, 1. Law 21 of 1991 further ex-
tends this evaluation to consider the spiritual impact extraction of natural resources may
have on Indian Communities. Law No. 21, Mar. 4, 1991, [39.720] Diario Oficial, 1. The
environment plays a central role in the moral and ethical beliefs of the Colombian Indians,
who perceive themselves as part of their natural surroundings. Thus, they regard someone
extracting resources from the earth, for example, as draining life directly from them, Robert
La Batte Woableza. Dakota Story Teller, at http://www.starhawk.com/uwa/ (last visited July
2001).
83 Law No. 99, Dec. 22, 1993, [41.146] Diario Oficial, 1. A Special Technical Commis-
sion composed by members from three different government agencies; the Colombian Insti-
tute of Agrarian Reform, the Colombian Institute of Geography, and the Ministry of
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The foregoing provision's requirements are difficult to meet due in part
to historically existent tensions between these groups and dominating ma-
jorities which come up and entangle the negotiations prior to obtaining an
approval to extract the reserves.84 This increases the company's costs and
the operation's risk since, even though chances of obtaining the approval are
high, it might take a considerable amount of time to do so.
VII. CONCLUSION
In geological terms, Colombia's attractiveness is high. Recent efforts
to modify transactional, environmental and tax aspects of the nation's oil
policy have substantially reduced the government's take,85 which is com-
paratively low. Nevertheless, the policy's social complexity, together with
the narrow window for negotiation it provides, the lack of an efficient alter-
native dispute resolution mechanism, the impossibility of assigning them
and their vague terms pertaining to events of default and indemnification by
Ecopetrol, materially affect the prospect of exploiting Colombian reserves.
Environment, verifies that these territories are in effect occupied by Indian and African-
Colombian communities. It also intermediates between the communities and the companies.
Law No. 70, Aug. 27, 1993, [41.013] Diario Oficial, 1. For further information on how this
commission operates, see Decree No. 1745, Oct. 12, 1995, [42.049] Diario Oficial, 1. De-
cree No. 1320, Jul. 13, 1998, [43.340 Diario Oficial, 2 regulates approval by Indian and Af-
rican-Colombian communities.
84 In 1998 Ecopetrol re-negotiated contractual terms with Occidental in exchange for its
agreement to give up its rights in the Samore block where U-wa Indians opposing oil devel-
opment had threatened to commit massive suicide, at http://www.starhawk.com/uwa/ (last
visited in July 2001). The U-wa tribe found the deed dated 1661 which accredits that title to
the land had been granted to them by the Spanish Crown. Occidental Petroleum contra el
Pueble U-wa, at http://www.geocities.com/asouwa/, these property rights had to be respected
by the government.
85 This consists of the production share received, the taxes paid by the associates, and the
royalties received by territorial entities from 85 percent to 65 percent. See La Nueva
Politica Petrolera, paragraph 13, Publicaciones, at
http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/prin/not.htm (last visited Jul.-Aug. 1999).
